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INTRODUCTION
Births by cesarean section surgery (or c-sections) rose by 50
percent from 1996 to 2006 in the United States.1 More than 30 percent
of U.S. women who give birth at the present time do so by c-section;2
which means that of the more than 4 million births per year, 1.2
million are c-sections.3 Because a woman experiences increased med-
ical risk with each cesarean birth,4 the question of whether she may
choose vaginal birth after a previous cesarean (VBAC) has entered
* Director of Birth Policy, Elephant Circle. I would like to thank National Advocates
for Pregnant Women for inspiring this Article through their 2009 Writing Contest, Nantiya
Ruan at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law for the research her students
did on the subject, and Deb Fisch and Shari Caudron for the feedback and editing.
1. CAROL SAKALA & MAUREEN P. CORRY, EVIDENCE-BASED MATERNITY CARE: WHAT
IT IS AND WHAT IT CAN ACHIEVE 41 (Milbank Memorial Fund 2008), available at http://
milbank.org/uploads/documents/0809MaternityCare/0809MaternityCare.html.
2. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2010, 61 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS
REPORT 1, 2, 9 (Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61
/nvsr61_01.pdf#table02.
3. Id. at 54 ( looking at births from 2004 to 2010).
4. Roger W. Harms, Repeat C-Sections: Is There a Limit?, MAYO CLINIC, http://www
.mayoclinic.com/health/c-sections/AN02070 ( last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
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the policy debate.5 Prior to the 1980s, women with previous c-sections
usually repeated the surgery for subsequent babies.6 Scarring on the
uterus from the first surgery generally led physicians to prefer sur-
gery to vaginal birth out of fear that scarring would increase the
risk of uterine rupture (a rare but potentially devastating condition
that can happen during labor).7 But as surgical birth techniques
improved, a different type of incision reduced the effects of scarring.8
In the 1980s, the National Institute of Health determined that women
with previous c-sections could safely undergo labor and, provided
they had received the appropriate type of incision in their earlier
surgery, would be able to deliver subsequent children vaginally.9
Despite these findings, many hospitals have enacted policies
prohibiting VBAC.10 Women seek legal options to challenge these
bans, because such policies represent barriers to informed consent
and the right to choose to give birth vaginally.11 This Article explores
various tort theories of recovery and how they might be applied to
the hospital VBAC ban scenario.
A typical VBAC ban scenario might unfold in the following
manner: Ana lives about five minutes away from St. Catherine’s
Hospital, which is located in a medium-sized town three hours drive
from a major metropolitan area. For her second pregnancy, Ana is see-
ing Dr. Gayatri, a family physician in private practice who also attends
births. The pregnancy is progressing well. Ana is considered low risk,
except for the scar from her previous cesarean, which she underwent
after a healthy first pregnancy when labor failed to progress.
Dr. Gayatri agrees that since Ana’s scar is of the low transverse
variety, the baby is well positioned, and Ana lacks any other risk
factors, Ana is well suited for a trial of labor and will probably be
able to give birth vaginally. After learning the relative risks and bene-
fits of VBAC and Elective Repeat Cesarean (ERCB), Ana and her
5. C.F. Chavez et al., Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Birth—California 1996–2000,
51(44) CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 996–98 (Nov. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5144a3.htm.
6. Id.; see also Bruce L. Flamm, Once a Cesarean, Always a Controversy, 90(2)
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 312 (Aug. 1997).
7. Chavez, supra note 5; Kevin S. Toppenberg & William A. Block, Uterine Rupture:
What Family Physicians Need to Know, 66 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 832, 826–27 (2002).
8. Toppenberg & Block, supra note 7, at 823–24.
9. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, Cesarean Childbirth: NIH Consensus Development Con-
ference Statement (Sept. 1980), available at http://consensus.nih.gov/1980/1980Cesarean
027html.htm.
10. Your Right to Refuse: What to Do If Your Hospital Has “Banned” VBAC Q & A,
INT’L CESAREAN AWARENESS NETWORK, http://www.fwhc.org/health/pdf_about_vbac.pdf
( last visited Jan. 10, 2014) [hereinafter ICAN].
11. Id.
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family opt for a “trial of labor” and vaginal delivery. Dr. Gayatri agrees
with that decision and does not recommend an ECRB—until she dis-
covers that the hospital recently instituted a policy prohibiting VBAC.
When Dr. Gayatri investigates, she learns that the hospital re-
evaluated its capacity to accommodate VBACs after the American
Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) adopted a
standard recommending VBACs be allowed only in hospitals staffed
for immediate emergency cesareans.12 After a New England Journal
of Medicine (NEJM) study made headlines about the danger of
uterine rupture during VBAC, the hospital decided VBAC was appro-
priate only for hospitals with round-the-clock surgical staff and St.
Catherine’s pool of on-call anesthesiologists did not suffice.13
Dr. Gayatri had just moved from a nearby metropolitan area
where she had attended many VBACs and had never encountered
professional concern or prohibitive policies. Based on a review of the
NEJM article, she felt the hospital’s concern to be misplaced. Dr.
Gayatri was disappointed to deliver news of the hospital’s restrictive
policy to Ana and her family. When they asked about their options,
Dr. Gayatri had no answer: she did not have admitting privileges at
the other hospital in town, there were no out-of-hospital birth centers
within three hours, and Ana’s family did not want a home birth. When
pushed by Dr. Gayatri, hospital administrators were unwilling to
change the policy, insisting that most people preferred ERCB anyway.
When Ana arrived at the hospital in labor, hoping to be far
enough along that she would be permitted to give birth vaginally, she
was chastised by a nurse and the on-call physician for waiting so
long to come to the hospital and for “risking your life and the life of
your baby.” They immediately attached an electronic fetal monitor,
which showed reassuring fetal heart tones, installed an IV, and
presented Ana with a number of forms to sign. When Ana asked for
Dr. Gayatri, the attending physician insisted that it was too late to
summon Dr. Gayatri and that the cesarean had to be performed
immediately. Ana was frustrated. While being given an epidural to
12. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 115, Vaginal Birth After Previous Cesarean Deliver,
116 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 450, 458 (Aug. 2010) (“. . . [T]he College recommends
that TOLAC be undertaken in facilities with staff immediately available to provide
emergency care. When resources for immediate cesarean delivery are not available, the
College recommends that health care providers and patients considering TOLAC discuss
the hospital’s resources and availability of obstetric, pediatric, anesthetic, and operating
room staffs. Respect for patient autonomy supports that patients should be allowed to
accept increased levels of risk, however, patients should be clearly informed of such
potential increase in risk and management alternatives.” ).
13. Jill MacCorkle, Fighting VBAC-Lash: Critiquing Current Research, MOTHERING
MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 2002, available at http://www.mothering.com/community/a/fighting
-vbac-lash-critiquing-current-research.
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numb the region, she insisted, “I don’t want a cesarean. I can give
birth to this baby myself.” The attending physician ignored Ana’s
protests, repeating the policy that patients with previous cesareans
could not give birth vaginally and demanded that Ana sign the
consent form. Ana felt pressured in the midst of her contractions and
did not know what else to do; she consented and the surgery was
performed. Ana was too groggy afterwards to hold her healthy new-
born, but she did remember Dr. Gayatri visiting and saying, “I’m
sorry you didn’t get to give birth vaginally as you wanted, but at least
you’re both healthy.”
Of course Ana was happy to have her baby with her, safe and
healthy. But she couldn’t shake the feeling that something went
wrong. Dr. Gayatri outwardly maintained a professional attitude,
not wishing to undermine her patient’s trust in the hospital; however,
she privately felt that Ana could have given birth vaginally and
should have been able to try.
This scenario is not uncommon. With millions of women experi-
encing primary c-sections every year,14 millions more face repeat
surgery for subsequent births. Because of hospital anti-VBAC pol-
icies, many of these women will have no option to give birth vagi-
nally. In the past decade, hospitals have increasingly instituted
such bans. The International Cesarean Awareness Network has
identified over 800 hospitals across the U.S. with such policies.15
This represents a large portion of the approximately 4900 hospitals
in the country, especially when considering the distribution of hos-
pitals across the country.16
The medical standard of care went from automatic repeat ce-
sarean to a trial of labor for a vaginal birth after a cesarean and is
now caught between the two.17 While public health officials are
working to increase VBACs, some hospitals are prohibiting VBACs.18
Some hospitals that ban VBACs have done so in response to a state-
ment from the ACOG and a 2001 study that boosted fears about
VBAC risks.19 Women like Ana are caught in the middle of this
14. Martin, supra note 2, at 54.
15. ICAN, supra note 10.
16. Total Hospitals: 2010, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, http://www
.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?cat=8&ind=382 ( last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
17. See supra text accompanying notes 5–10.
18. SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 1, at 16, 41–42 (addressing the national health
objectives for 2010 and reporting that in 2005 92% of people who had a previous cesarean
had a subsequent one).
19. MacCorkle, supra note 13, at 19 (citing Mona Lydon-Rochelle et al., Risk of
Uterine Rupture during Labor Among Women with a Prior Cesarean Delivery, 345 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 3 (2001); Michael F. Greene, Vaginal Delivery after Cesarean Section: Is the
Risk Acceptable?, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 54 (2001)).
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dispute, desiring more options for themselves and others, and seek-
ing justice when their autonomy has been harmed by these policies.20
In a search for legal solutions to Ana’s impasse, the law of torts pro-
vides particularly fertile ground: medical malpractice liability, with
its hefty influence on hospital policy and medical decision-making,
may present the powerful lever needed to move policies in Ana’s
direction.21 This Article will explore possible tort claims against the
hospital with a VBAC ban, from corporate negligence to vicarious
liability, and the feasibility of bringing those claims.
I. THE TORTS THEORY OF RECOVERY
The law of torts provides compensation for harms.22 An over-
arching theme to these remedies is that conduct which is socially
unreasonable will lead to liability.23 Torts are “directed toward the
compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for losses which
they have suffered within the scope of their legally recognized in-
terests generally . . . where the law considers that compensation is
required.” 24 Torts uses economic remedies to symbolically make the
plaintiff whole again.25
Before modern negligence doctrine, physicians could be sued
through a contract theory based on their failure to satisfy an ex-
press promise.26 Later, the doctrine of common callings established
20. See ICAN, supra note 10; see also Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 ( Ill.
App. Ct. 1994).
21. It is not, however, the only place to look. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
consider the constitutional issues relating to the right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment (as a Free Expression and Privacy interest). But see In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C.
1990); Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. at 1247; In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997); Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 326. See also April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise
Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563 (2002).
Nor is it possible here to discuss the right to make parenting decisions (even when the state
believes it could make better ones than the parents). See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (“[T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its
children—and its adults—by forcing all to live in certain narrowly def ined family pat-
terns.” ); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not
permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right  of parents to make child rearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.” ).
Although there are some compelling cases on point, that discussion has been covered to
some extent in other places. Nonetheless, further discussion of the constitutional issues
are def initely warranted, especially in light of this tort analysis.
22. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5–6 (5th
ed. 1984).
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 5–6.
25. Id.
26. Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurispru-
dence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1196–97 (1992).
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a general duty of care for practitioners, regardless of whether they
had made express promises.27 Liability that initially derived from
express agreements expanded to general principles of reasonable-
ness: conduct was reasonable depending on circumstances, unrea-
sonable if the risks outweighed the benefits.28 A physician who was
hired to remove a spleen, but who also removed a cancerous mass,
would be considered reasonable under the circumstances, despite
the express agreement to remove only the spleen.29 A physician’s
standard of care was “reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in
the exertion of his skill and the application of his knowledge, to
accomplish the purpose for which he is employed.” 30 Eventually this
concept expanded to encompass what we now know as negligence.31
During this period of change, hospitals were evolving from reli-
gious institutions to humanitarian charities, and later, to centers of
surgery and technology.32 At first, hospital liability was significantly
limited by the doctrine of charitable immunity and the fact that in-
dividual physicians made clinical decisions, not hospitals as institu-
tions.33 Charitable immunity is based on “the special status of the
defendant” in order to protect social values, such as providing hospi-
tal services, that are deemed more important than the potential harms
of negligently providing such services.34 As hospitals have increas-
ingly developed into businesses, charitable immunity has shifted,
making room for hospital liability.35
Many jurisdictions now recognize the doctrine of corporate lia-
bility, equating hospitals with other corporations as entities that
can be sued for negligence.36 Corporate liability doctrine serves to
establish a direct duty of care between hospital and patient.37 Yet
courts have found that the medical decisions involved require ex-
pertise that could be given only by physicians and not by corporate
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1197, 1201, 1216–17.
29. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Bryan, 594 A.2d 353 (Pa Super. Ct. 1991) (f inding a doctor
who removed excess scar tissue during back surgery to ensure the surgery’s success with-
out explicit permission for removal of the scar tissue not liable because “waiting until ap-
pellants’ express consent for the particular procedure could be obtained would have had
a seriously adverse effect on husband to the material detriment of his health”).
30. Silver, supra note 26, at 1209 (quoting Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.H. 460, 471
(1863)).
31. Id. at 1211.
32. See GUENTER B. RISSE, MENDING BODIES, SAVING SOULS: A HISTORY OF HOSPITALS 
675–77 (1999).
33. Shelley S. Fraser, Hospital Liability: Drawing a Fine Line with Informed Consent
in Today’s Evolving Health Care Arena, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 253, 255 (2004).
34. KEETON, supra note 22, at 1032.
35. Id. at 1070.
36. Fraser, supra note 33, at 255.
37. Id.
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agents, and as a result have resisted treating hospitals the same
as other corporations.38 Further complicating hospital liability,
some states have enacted legislation to protect hospitals from such
legal culpability.39
While VBAC bans are the perfect example of hospital decision-
making that is generally protected as clinical, it is also an example
of hospital policies that contribute to the trend of increased hospital
liability.40 Since no cases have yet arisen against a hospital for a
VBAC ban, it is not clear whether a court would be willing to find
a hospital liable under a tort theory of recovery. The following sec-
tions of this Article will explore the two main avenues for making a
claim against a hospital for VBAC bans: corporate negligence and
vicarious liability.
A corporate negligence claim against a hospital would, of neces-
sity, focus on the VBAC ban itself, because the hospital as an insti-
tution uses physicians to perform the surgery rather than performing
surgeries directly.41 The claim would have to establish that the pol-
icy itself was negligently made or enacted.42 The hospital could be lia-
ble through vicarious liability only for surgeries that resulted from
the ban.43
Vicarious liability claims can involve hospitals in medical mal-
practice actions through principles of respondeat superior (rarely
used against hospitals in the case of a physician’s negligence, since
physicians tend to be independent contractors), non-delegable duty,
or apparent/ostensible agency.44 All of these arise from agency doc-
trine, which allows for secondary liability in a third party who has
some degree of control over the person with immediate liability.45
These principles allow courts to hold hospitals liable when a hospital’s
agent or employee has breached his own standard of care; the court
must find the agent negligent before it can find the hospital liable.46
Under vicarious liability the hospital wouldn’t be directly liable for
the policy, but rather, would be liable for negligence resulting from
38. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ill. 1965) (quoting from
the defendant’s brief, “ ‘[i]t is a fundamental rule of law that only an individual properly
educated and licensed, and not a corporation, may practice medicine.’ ” ).
39. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987) (f inding that hos-
pitals have a non-delegable duty when it comes to the emergency room superseded by
codif ied hospital immunity).
40. See Fraser, supra note 33, at 255 (discussing the evolution of hospital liability).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 256.
43. Id. at 260–61.
44. Id. at 260–69.
45. Id. at 277–78.
46. See Fraser, supra note 33, at 255.
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the policy. The following sections will explore corporate negligence
and vicarious liability in turn.
II. CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE
The basic elements of negligence (duty, breach, causation, and
damages)47 remain the same regardless of the type of defendant,
although the structures for establishing each element may vary. In
medical malpractice, for example, expert testimony may be required
to establish breach, while for some forms of hospital liability, breach
can be established by what any reasonable person would do under the
circumstances.48 Regardless of this variance, the heart of negligence
is the standard of care.49 The question is whether the hospital has
a specialized duty that only an expert would understand, or whether
the hospital has a common-sense duty that anyone could understand.50
A general negligence claim against the hospital would employ
the doctrine of corporate liability to point out that duties between
hospitals and patients do exist and that the creation of a VBAC ban
is a breach because a reasonable person, under the circumstances,
would not determine that the risks of a mandatory surgery outweigh
the benefits.51
The doctrine of corporate negligence creates a direct duty of care
between hospital and patient as a result of the special relationship
between the two.52 Many of these duties are drawn from generally
recognized negligence principles, like premises liability and respondeat
superior, but corporate negligence theory is more expansive as it rec-
ognizes “some form of systemic negligence by the hospital” rather than
vicarious liability alone.53 Jurisdictions that recognize this theory of
recovery also disagree about whether the standard of care requires
expert testimony or whether it is based on what a reasonable person
would do under the circumstances.54
The case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital
was one of the first to establish a direct duty of care owed by a hospital
47. Elements of a Negligence Case, FIND LAW, http://injury.findlaw.com/accident-injury
-law/elements-of-a-negligence-case.html ( last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
48. Andrea G. Nadel, Hospital’s Liability for Negligence in Failing to Review or
Supervise Treatment Given by Doctor, or to Require Consultation, 12 A.L.R.4th 57 (1982).
49. Sonja Larsen, Hospitals and Asylums, in 40A AM. JUR. § 26 (2d ed. 2013).
50. See Nadel, supra note 48, at 63–64.
51. Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice that Should Be Supported,
32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 358–59 (2008).
52. See Nadel, supra note 48, at 64.
53. Stroud v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
54. Fraser, supra note 33, at 257.
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to a patient, independent of the physician.55 The court in Darling
recognized the changes in hospital care and agreed that changes in
liability should follow.56 The court articulated several important
points: first, “the conception that the hospital does not undertake to
treat the patient . . . no longer reflects the fact[s],” and second, that
“[p]resent-day hospitals . . . do far more than furnish facilities for
treatment.” 57 The court also noted: “[t]he Standards for Hospital
Accreditation, the state licensing regulations and the defendant’s
bylaws demonstrate that the medical profession and other respon-
sible authorities regard it as both desirable and feasible that a hos-
pital assume certain responsibilities for the care of the patient.” 58
Many authorities agree that the duties recognized under corporate
liability theory include a) the duty to provide safe and adequate
equipment and facilities; b) the duty to select and retain staff physi-
cians properly; and c) the duty to oversee medical care, and promul-
gate rules and policies to ensure quality care.59
The duty to provide equipment and facilities would be applicable
only in a VBAC ban case where a physician or patient sought access
to hospital facilities for a vaginal delivery after a previous c-section
and was refused on that account. The duty to select and supervise
physicians is also not likely to be applicable in a VBAC ban case. The
selection and supervision of physicians by hospitals is a complex
matter. Historically, hospitals have given physicians wide latitude
to go about their work unhindered.60 But because contemporary cor-
porate structures sometimes cause physicians and hospitals to be in
direct competition in the healthcare market, traditional selection
and supervision practices are eroding.61 VBAC bans are an excellent
example of how the wide latitude hospitals previously allowed phy-
sicians has been replaced by policies in which hospitals deliberately
attempt to influence medical decisions.62
55. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965) (establishing a direct
duty of care between hospital and patient).
56. See Fraser, supra note 33, at 255.
57. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
58. Id.
59. Larsen, supra note 49; see also David H. Rutchik, The Emerging Trend of Corporate
Liability: Courts’ Uneven Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain
and Exposed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 535, 540–48 (1994).
60. Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Tradi-
tional Relationships, DUKE L.J. 1071, 1074–75 (1984).
61. Id. at 1075–76; see also John D. Blum, Beyond the Bylaws: Hospital-Physician
Relationships, Economics and Conflicting Agendas, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 460 (2005);
Nadel, supra note 48.
62. See Havighurst, supra note 60, at 1075.
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The duties to oversee medical care and promulgate rules and
policies to ensure quality care are all implicated by the enactment
of a VBAC ban, which is in essence a policy requiring that all pa-
tients who come to the hospital in labor have surgery if they had a
previous cesarean.63 The question is whether enacting the policy is
sufficient to trigger a duty directly between a plaintiff and the hos-
pital. Three kinds of cases address this question: cases where the
hospital enacted a policy, cases where the hospital failed to enact a
policy or enacted a deficient policy, and cases where the hospital
voluntarily undertook an action that carried with it a special duty
to the patient.64
III. WHEN THE HOSPITAL ENACTS A POLICY
One harm resulting from VBAC bans is the lack of informed
consent; by establishing a blanket refusal to VBACs, the hospital
makes a clinical decision for every patient, regardless of her consent
or refusal.65 Therefore, it would be helpful to find case law establish-
ing that hospitals have a duty to ensure that patients give informed
consent for every procedure. In theory, if a hospital enacts an in-
formed consent policy, they assume an implied duty to protect the
patient from lack of consent (the kind of harm warned against in the
policy). But the case law has not supported this theory.66 In the cases
involving hospitals that enacted informed consent policies, courts
have held that the presence of a policy generally does not create a
duty on the part of the hospital to oversee the informed consent
process or ensure that it took place.67
In Campbell v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, the hospital
was found to have a direct informed consent duty; however, since
the decision was split, it bears no precedential value.68 The court’s
63. See Law, supra note 51, at 357.
64. See infra Part III.
65. Heather Joy Baker, “We Don’t Want to Scare the Ladies”: An Investigation of
Maternal Rights and Informed Consent Throughout the Birth Process, 31 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP. 4, 583.
66. Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 475 (Conn. 1990) (f inding no hospital duty for
non-employee physician’s violation of hospital informed consent policy); see also Mele v.
Sherman Hosp., 838 F.2d 923, 925 (7th Cir. 1988) (f inding that hospital bylaws and
consent forms are not a voluntary assumption of duty); Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664
A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (f inding that a regulation requiring doctors to get
informed consent did not create a duty in the hospital to have policies and procedures
to ensure informed consent).
67. Mele, 838 F.2d at 925.
68. Campbell v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 352 S.E.2d 902, 907 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987),
aff’d, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987).
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majority determined that the general duty a hospital has to “over-
see the treatment” included “the specific duty, under the particular
facts and circumstances of this case” to ensure informed consent and
create procedures for reporting dangerous treatment.69 While this
case is an outlier, it does illustrate both that “specific facts and cir-
cumstances” can lead to novel outcomes and that courts may be
open to recognizing an informed consent duty in the hospital.70
However, the facts in Campbell were unlike those in the VBAC
ban scenario in many ways: the Campbell patient was harmed by a
lack of disclosure instead of a lack of consent, that deficiency re-
sulted in a vaginal delivery instead of a cesarean, and there was harm
to the infant instead of the mother.71 VBAC bans pose a slightly dif-
ferent question about the extent to which the act of creating policies
establishes a duty of care between hospital and patient. VBAC bans
injure patients by forcing them to have surgery and abrogating their
right of refusal.72 The question is whether hospitals with conflicting
policies, both VBAC bans and informed consent rules, could be liable
for violating their own standard of care.
The difficulty of this approach is that even when courts have
recognized that “violation of an employer’s work rules can be viewed
as evidence of negligence,” they have also been clear that “ ‘hospital
rules, regulations and policies do not themselves establish the stan-
dard of care.’ ” 73 Thus, Campbell does not provide much in the way
of analogy or precedent, while emphasizing how duty flows away
from the hospital and toward the physician.74
If a physician flouts a hospital VBAC ban and experiences a bad
birth outcome, the failure to follow the VBAC ban policy (“violation
of employer’s work rules”) could be used as evidence of the physi-
cian’s negligence.75 This tension between the respective duties of
hospital and physician creates an incentive for the physician to fol-
low the policy, even when doing so is at odds with her professional
judgment, and creates no corresponding disincentive for the hospital
to maintain such a policy.
69. Id. at 908.
70. Id. at 907.
71. Id. at 904.
72. See Law, supra note 51, at 358–59.
73. See Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1990) (quoting Van Steensburg
v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., 481 A.2d 750 (Conn. 1984)).
74. Campbell v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 352 S.E.2d 902, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987),
aff’d, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987).
75. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 479.
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A. When Hospital Policy Is Absent or Deficient
Cases in which there is a failure to create a policy or a deficient
policy exists are better analogies to the VBAC ban because they
suggest that the hospital’s policy-making function itself may be
negligent.76 In these cases, courts identify the hospital policy-making
function itself as deficient because managerial control of the process
could have prevented injury.77 The plaintiffs in both Jennison v.
Providence St. Vincent Medical Center and Edwards v. Brandywine
Hospital were exposed to egregious negligence in the hospital, result-
ing from a series of unfortunate events and missed opportunities, in-
cluding having a central line negligently inserted and left unchecked
and having a heparin lock left in place for three days.78 Injury could
have been avoided had the hospital exerted more managerial control,
by having policies for tending to central lines after insertion or limit-
ing the use of heparin locks.79 These two cases stand for the hospital’s
duty to create policies that ensure quality care, and triggering liability
for the injuries resulting from negligent care.80
In the case of VBAC bans, however, the problem is too much
managerial control or managerial control that is negligently blind
to relevant facts (e.g., the needs of specific bodies, or the authority
of individuals to conduct their own risk analysis).81 VBAC bans are
deficient policies because in contrast to a policy that would be bene-
ficial to all patients (e.g., tending to a central line after insertion),
they expose some patients to unnecessary risk.82 This argument,
however, does not find easy traction within the existing construction
of the law. In Jennison and Edwards the injuries were a result of
negligent medical care.83 The injuries were not a direct result of de-
ficient policies; deficient policies just made the negligent care more
possible.84 Ironically, VBAC bans make negligent care necessary for
76. See Jennison v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 358, 367 (Or. App. 2001)
(f inding that signing a consent form implies a policy or procedure for follow-through re-
garding the treatment consented to and when such a policy is missing, liability may flow,
but deciding the case on apparent agency grounds); Edwards v. Brandywine Hosp., 652
A.2d 1382, 1388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (f inding that having a def icient standard leaves the
hospital open to liability).
77. Id.
78. See Jennison, 25 P.3d at 362; Edwards, 652 A.2d at 1385.
79. See Jennison, 25 P.3d at 367; Edwards, 652 A.2d at 1388.
80. See Jennison, 25 P.3d at 363; Edwards, 652 A.2d at 1388.
81. See MacCorkle, supra note 13, at 19.
82. Id.
83. Jennison v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 358, 362 (Or. App. 2001);
Edwards v. Brandywine Hosp., 652 A.2d 1382, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
84. Id.
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some patients.85 Sadly, the law is ill equipped to address this kind
of systemic negligence.86
B. When Hospital Acts Create Certain Duties
A few exceptional cases recognize a hospital’s duty to ensure
informed consent.87 These cases arise in the specific context of a
hospital that has agreed to participate in a clinical trial regulated
by the federal government, with governmental imposition of certain
informed consent requirements as part of the study.88 In these cases
courts acknowledge that informed consent is a duty that usually
attaches exclusively to the physician, but here expands to the hospi-
tal based on the hospital’s acceptance of the informed consent duty
as imposed by federal regulation.89
The plaintiff in Friter v. Iolab Corporation had cataract surgery
and a synthetic lens implanted.90 The plaintiff did not know that the
lens was experimental nor that he was taking part in a clinical study,
that was under FDA regulation which required extensive informed
consent procedures.91 The court acknowledged that informed con-
sent, duty, and battery actions usually attached to the physician,
but that the facts of this case were so different that both actions
could attach to the hospital. When the hospital agreed to provide an
experimental procedure that was then performed without the re-
quired consent, the hospital could be liable for battery.92
The facts in Friter supported the plaintiff because the hospital
knew of the informed consent requirement and had medical infor-
mation that the plaintiff did not have; namely, that the procedure
was experimental.93 Perhaps a VBAC ban plaintiff could use the
Friter case as an analogy: the hospital knows that there is a general
informed consent requirement, but withholds that duty for all pa-
tients with prior c-sections. Though giving birth is not the same as
signing up to participate in a clinical trial, the unique facts of a
VBAC ban case might allow a court to accept the Friter analogy.
85. See MacCorkle, supra note 13, at 19.
86. See Friter v. Iolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
87. Id. at 1116; Boyd v. Somerset, 24 Pa. D. & C. 4th 564, 572 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1993).
88. Friter, 607 A.2d at 1116.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1111 (f inding that judgment non obstante vertico was improper where the
facts allow for a hospital informed consent duty and battery cause of action); see also
Boyd, 24 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 572.
91. Id. at 1111–12.
92. Friter, 607 A.2d at 1113.
93. Id. at 1111–12.
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VBAC bans, in such an analogy, would be equivalent to experimental
trials without an “opt-out” provision.
C. Limits of the Doctrine of Corporate Negligence for VBAC Bans
Instead of acting as a deterrent to VBAC bans, the law creates
incentives for hospitals to create such policies and for physicians to
uphold them. Almost every cesarean versus vaginal delivery case
involves liability on a physician’s part for delaying or failing to per-
form a cesarean.94 Very few cases can be found of physicians or hos-
pitals being sued for unnecessary cesareans; when they exist, the
defendants are generally not held liable.95 In fact, medical defen-
dants are more often held liable for “performing” a vaginal delivery.96
A large margin of error in judgment exists regarding which patients
require cesareans. If cesareans do more harm than good over a rate
of fifteen percent, then at least fifteen to twenty percent of all cesar-
eans performed in this country are statistically unnecessary or do
more harm than good;97 yet this fact has not led to a significant risk
of liability.98 In addition, the law customarily gives deference to med-
ical decision-making and limits hospital duties as described above.99
Although the duty to oversee medical care and promulgate rules and
policies to ensure quality care is relevant to VBAC bans, they do not
amount to the creation of a duty to ensure informed consent, prevent
unwanted medical treatment, or a duty to create policies that are
not negligent medical decisions when applied to certain patients.100
IV. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In the alternative, to make a claim against the hospital based
on the surgery itself and not the VBAC ban, vicarious liability is
required, since it was through the surgeon that the cesarean was
94. See Beomsoo Kim, Current Research on Medical Malpractice Liability: The Impact
of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S79, S82 (2007).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Fernando Althabe & Jose Belizan, Caesarean Section: The Paradox, 368  LANCET
1472, 1472–73 (Oct. 28, 2006).
98. See Jay Zitter, Liability of Hospital, Physician, or Other Medical Personnel for
Death or Injury to Mother or Child Caused by Improper Choice Between, or Timing Of,
Vaginal or Cesarean Delivery, 4 A.L.R.5th 171 (John A. Glenn ed., 1992) (examining cases
that overwhelmingly f ind liability when vaginal delivery was chosen over surgical, and
not when surgical was chosen over vaginal, unless some other negligence was involved).
99. Id. at 208.
100. See id. at 208–09.
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performed.101 The same rules of negligence apply: duty, breach, cau-
sation and damages,102 but the focus is on the acts of the physician
and the relationship between physician and hospital. Vicarious lia-
bility establishes that, “by reason of some relation existing between
A and B, the negligence of A is to be charged against B, although B
has played no part in it.”103 Vicarious liability allows the hospital to
be implicated through the physician’s duty and standard of care;
the hospital’s liability depends on whether the claim comes from
respondeat superior, a non-delegable duty, or apparent agency.104
The control analysis of vicarious liability is especially appro-
priate in the case of VBAC bans, where the hospital dictates the
course of treatment to all patients in a certain category and to all
physicians as well. Under a VBAC ban, even though the physician
is performing the cesarean, she cannot be said to be acting inde-
pendently based on her own medical judgment.105 Nonetheless, vicar-
ious liability requires the negligence to be located in the actions of
the physician.106 This presents a problem in the VBAC ban scenario:
the harm is not that the cesarean section was performed negli-
gently, but rather that it was performed against the principles of
informed consent.107 To challenge the VBAC ban and resulting sur-
gery under a vicarious liability theory requires proving that lack of
informed refusal is negligent based on the physician’s duty to secure
informed consent.108
A. Informed Consent Doctrine
Informed consent developed as a cause of action for patients
injured as a result of unauthorized medical treatment.109 It arises
from a duty to disclose information material to treatment and re-
frain from treatment until consent is given.110 The doctrine is based
on Justice Cardozo’s 1914 finding that “ ‘[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body.’ ”111 Informed consent has consistently been
101. See KEETON, supra note 22, at 499.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 499–508.
105. Id at 501–02.
106. Id. at 499.
107. KEETON, supra note 22, at 502–03.
108. Id. at 499, 502–03.
109. See Robert Gatter, The Mysterious Survival of the Policy Against Informed Consent
Liability for Hospitals, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2006).
110. Id. at 1208–09.
111. Fraser, supra note 33, at 257 (citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) (describing facts in which a patient contends that while she had
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held to be the exclusive duty of the physician,112 precluding hospital
liability in all but a few cases where the treating physician was an
employee or agent of the hospital, or when the hospital housed med-
ical research, as discussed above in Friter.113 Exceptions evolved at
common law, but some states have codified in statute the physician’s
informed consent duty.114
Informed consent generally comprises two parts: disclosure of
information and abstention from treatment until the patient con-
sents.115 The disclosure element constrains the scope of information
to be conveyed to that which is “material.”116 Jurisdictions are split
on the standard of materiality between what a “reasonable medical
practitioner” would disclose and what a “reasonable patient” would
want to know.117 Breach of disclosure also requires causation: that
a reasonable person would not have consented to the treatment had
material information been conveyed, and that the treatment caused
the harm.118 When the physician fails to abstain from treatment, the
elements are usually that of battery: harmful or offensive contact
intended to set a force in motion that causes the contact.119 Battery
recognizes the integrity of the person and the right to be free from
intentional unpermitted contact.120
Both parts of the informed consent doctrine prove inadequate
in the VBAC ban scenario. The plaintiff’s complaint is rarely a fail-
ure of disclosure, since such plaintiffs are usually highly educated
about the risks and benefits of cesareans, and even when it is, it’s
not the lack of disclosure that causes the harm.121 The physician’s
failure to abstain from treatment is due to a policy to which both the
physician and patient are held. Ultimately, plaintiffs like Ana for-
mally consent to treatment even when they do not really have a
choice; and this is the crux of the problem. Consent becomes mean-
ingless when it does not accompany choice.
expressly refused surgery, it was nevertheless performed while she was unconscious.
Nonetheless, the court established that a hospital could not be liable for the physician’s
breach of informed consent duty), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656 (1957)).
112. Gatter, supra note 109, at 1207.
113. Friter v. Iolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1114–16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
114. Suzanne K. Ketler, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural Analysis of the
Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1035–36 (2001).
115. See, e.g., Gatter, supra note 109, at 1208–09.
116. Id.
117. Ketler, supra note 114, at 1035–36; see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
786 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing the reasonable patient standard).
118. Gatter, supra note 109, at 1209–10.
119. KEETON, supra note 22, at 39.
120. Id.
121. See ICAN, supra note 10 (showing an example of resources available to women
about challenging hospital VBAC bans).
2014]    CHALLENGING HOSPITAL VBAC BANS THROUGH TORT LIABILITY 415
B. Informed Consent Under Respondeat Superior
Respondeat superior is the legal doctrine specifying that a
master is liable for the acts of his servant.122 This is most straight-
forward when the medical care provider is an employee of the hospi-
tal and the employee is subject to control by the hospital. This issue
of control is based on several elements, including the skill required,
supplier of the place and instrumentality, method of payment, length
of the relationship, dictator of the details of the work, kind of occu-
pation, and customs as to supervision.123 Generally, physicians are
considered independent contractors under the law and hospitals are
consequently not considered to have the requisite control over phy-
sicians to create institutional liability.124
Protection of the independence of physicians and the special
physician-patient relationship is so strong that cases finding hospi-
tal liability even for employee physicians’ failure to disclose material
information are the exception rather than the rule.125 Cases involving
employee physicians generally find that the physician-patient rela-
tionship is so delicate, and the medical and individual information
so nuanced, that the hospital should not and does not have suffi-
cient control of the informed consent process to warrant liability.126
122. See KEETON, supra note 22, at 499.
123. Id. at 501.
124. See, e.g., Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1238 (Pa. 2002)
(holding the hospital lacked control over the manner a doctor performed his duty, which
then precluded vicarious liability for informed consent).
125. See, e.g., Gotlin v. Lederman, 367 F. Supp. 2d 349, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (overturn-
ing dismissal of informed consent claim against hospital, where the complaint alleged
vicarious liability for breach of the duty of disclosure by physicians alleged to be the
employees or agents of the hospital); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 772 P.2d 1027, 1031
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding a hospital can be vicariously liable for its physicians’ breach
of the duty of disclosure, but only where it is established that the physician was employed
by the hospital).
126. See Valles, 805 A.2d at 1238–39; Fiorentino v. Wenger, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App.
Div. 1966) (mem.), rev’d, 227 N.E.2d 296, 300 (N.Y. 1967) (f inding that hospitals do not
have an obligation to oversee physicians and make sure they fulf ill their disclosure duties,
because the doctor-patient relationship is one of great delicacy and third parties should
not interfere). Some courts have found vicarious liability based on the nurse’s informed
consent duty, but this is also rare. See Campbell v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 352 S.E.2d
902, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987) (containing testimony about
nurse standard of care that includes “assuring that the patient had an explanation.” ).
But see Butler v. S. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 452 S.E.2d 768, 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“In
obtaining a consent form, a nurse is not acting as a ‘borrowed servant’ of the doctor.” );
Marsh v. Crawford Long Hosp. of Emory Univ., 444 S.E.2d 357, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a nurse performing a ministerial task of recording a patient’s consent on a
form is not a “borrowed servant”); Ritter v. Delaney, 790 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1990) (hold-
ing that when a hospital relinquishes control of nurse to physician it does not create a
duty in the hospital).
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In the case of VBAC bans, the hospital clearly has sufficient
control of the acts of the surgeon and the nurses directly through
the VBAC policy.127 This control may prove that the physicians were
employees, but it still does not establish that the informed consent
duty can flow to the hospital.128 In addition, while the law is more
fully developed in cases where there is a lack of disclosure, here the
other prong is violated.129 A plaintiff like Ana may be able to argue
that VBAC bans turn the surgeon into an agent of the hospital and
therefore the hospital should be liable for not providing the corollary
of informed consent, i.e., informed refusal.
C. Informed Consent as a Non-Delegable Duty
The non-delegable duty principal circumvents the traditional
lack of hospital-physician control based on the idea that the particu-
lar duty is so significant, that even when the hospital delegates it
to another, the hospital can still be held liable.130 When courts have
identified a non-delegable duty, their analysis often resembles the
corporate liability analysis described above, positing that “a person
or entity entrusted with important duties in certain circumstances
may not assign those duties to someone else and then expect to
walk away unscathed when things go wrong.”131 The challenge
with the VBAC ban scenario is that both the “wrong” and the non-
delegable duty are the same thing: lack of consent and lack of in-
formed refusal.132
To successfully challenge the VBAC ban as a non-delegable
duty, one would have to establish, counter to precedent, that informed
consent is an important duty originating with the hospital and dele-
gated to the physician.133 A plaintiff would also have to prove the
physician was negligent because he violated the informed consent
standard of care by not allowing for refusal.134 The physician was
negligent in a non-delegable duty (informed consent), so the hospital
would then be liable.135 However, even where hospitals take overt
127. See SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 1 (describing how many women are unable to
f ind physicians who will perform VBACs due to hospital bans).
128. See Valles, 805 A.2d at 1239.
129. Id.
130. KEETON, supra note 22, at 511.
131. Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312 (S.C. 2000) (establishing that
hospitals can be liable for their non-employee E.R. doctors through the doctrine of non-
delegable duty); see also Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1276, 1384–87 (Alaska 1987).
132. See Simmons, 533 S.E.2d at 317–23.
133. See Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1238 (Pa. 2002).
134. See Friter v. Iolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1114–16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
135. See Simmons, 533 S.E.2d at 317, 320.
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steps in the informed consent process by providing consent to treat
forms, for example, or having informed consent policies, those acts
rarely amount to an informed consent duty (as discussed above).136
D. Informed Consent and Apparent Agency
The doctrine of apparent agency confronts the barrier of physi-
cians’ traditional independence from the hospital, by asserting that
certain representations make the physician appear to be acting for
the hospital, thus leading the patient to believe the hospital is really
in control.137 For the sake of liability, the physician is either an inde-
pendent contractor and the hospital is not liable, or the physician is
an apparent agent and the hospital is liable.138
In many cases, informed consent forms provide notice of a phy-
sician’s independent contractor status, with the intent of protecting
the hospital from liability under an apparent agency theory.139 These
forms confuse the purpose of informed consent, making it an issue
of notice rather than of decision-making autonomy.140 This misdirec-
tion creates a legal imperative on the part of hospitals to provide
notice as to the physician-hospital relationship, but does not create
a duty on the part of hospitals to disclose material information, ab-
stain from treatment without consent, assure that physicians dis-
close material information, document consent, or prevent treatment
from being given without consent.141
In the absence of these latter duties, even the substantial ap-
parent agency arguments present in the VBAC ban scenario have
nowhere to go. In the evolving field of hospital liability it is possible
that the existence of the VBAC ban could help establish that the
physicians were agents of the hospital, as the hospital controls the
medical decisions of physicians through the VBAC policy.142 But
136. Id. at 320.
137. KEETON, supra note 22, at 508 (explaining that apparent agency is also referred
to as ostensible agency; sometimes apparent agency is confused with agency by estoppel
which is not a negligence theory but rather arises out of agency law, but is ultimately
similar and often conflated).
138. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 33, at 260, 264.
139. See, e.g., Brown ex rel. Brown v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 899 So.2d 227, 240, 242 (Ala.
2004); Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 152–53 (Ind. 1999); Burless v. W.
Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 96–98 (W.Va. 2004) (noting that consent forms iden-
tifying the doctors as independent contractors may or may not be suff icient to establish
or overcome agency).
140. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 33, at 273.
141. See Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296, 300 (N.Y. 1967) (Rabin, J., concurring)
(f inding no duty to assure consent); Newell v. Trident Med. Ctr., 597 S.E.2d 776, 781 (S.C.
2004) (f inding no hospital duty based on lack of agency relationship).
142. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 33, at 265.
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even if physicians are agents of the hospital, there is a valid com-
plaint against the hospital only if the physicians had a duty and
breached a standard of care.143
Does this mean physicians have a duty to violate hospital policy
in order to provide informed consent? This could expand physician
liability, and still fails to address the hospital’s role: by putting
physicians in this compromising position the hospital creates a risk
that demands a duty and a heightened standard of care.144
E. Physician’s Duty to Accept Refusal
When a patient explicitly refuses to consent to care, the physi-
cian’s duty to abstain from treatment is substantial.145 In the case
of a VBAC ban, it would seem obvious that this duty should take prec-
edence over hospital policy, so that someone like Ana could simply
refuse the cesarean, despite the policy. However, the pregnancy con-
text complicates this rule as a result of precedent in both law and
culture for curtailing women’s rights during labor.146 Even though
the Constitution supports the right of refusal,147 cultural disagree-
ment abounds on this point,148 as does substantial potential for
liability when there is harm to a newborn.149 The refusal standard
is muddy when it comes to the practice of obstetrics, in which many
procedures are performed without consent as a matter of course.150
143. Id. at 264.
144. Id. at 253–55.
145. See, e.g., Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962, 968 (2001) (f inding summary judgment
improper where there was material fact as to the patient’s refusal).
146. See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1256–57
(N.D. Fla. 1999) (finding that a court-ordered cesarean section did not violate the mother’s
rights); People v. Rosburg, 805 P.2d 432, 437–40 (Colo. 1991) (holding that the state may
proscribe the unlicensed practice of midwifery without violating the due process of preg-
nant women who want to give birth at home); In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 400,
405–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 332–35 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (f inding that labor interventions against the mother’s will did violate her consti-
tutional rights); see also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243, 1252–53 (D.C. 1990) (explaining
that even though the court ultimately found for A.C., it might have been okay to perform
surgery without her consent); Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 335, 359–61 (Ill. 1988)
(rejecting maternal liability for harm to the fetus since mother and child in this context
are not adversaries); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437–58, 463–64 (1983) (arguing that women
accept additional duties and relinquish certain rights when pregnant); Katherine A.
Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death’s Door, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 87, 93–99
(1997) (explaining that most states have living will restrictions for pregnant women).
147. See Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 331.
148. Id. at 331–32.
149. See, e.g. Robertson, supra note 146, at 438–42 (an extreme example of potential
liability).
150. Zitter, supra note 98, at § 2(a).
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In Curtis v. Jaskey,151 a pregnant woman started seeing a physi-
cian for prenatal care and expressly refused to have an episiotomy
during labor. She reminded the physician of this on subsequent
visits.152 When she was admitted for an induction of labor, she signed
consent forms, crossing out the consent to episiotomy.153 Labor pro-
gressed quickly; in the final stages of labor her perineum began to
tear and the physician performed an episiotomy.154 The trial court
granted summary judgment for the hospital based on expert testi-
mony that the procedure was an emergency and consent was im-
practical.155 The court of appeals found that there was a question of
fact as to the plaintiff’s refusal and remanded the case.156 The court
also clarified that the emergency exception, based on the doctrine
of implied consent, did not apply where there was an express refusal
on record.157 At the very least this case emphasizes the importance
of express refusal in the childbirth context.
Protection of the “delicate” physician-patient informed consent
process is one of the biggest barriers to hospitals’ vicarious liability
in the VBAC ban scenario.158 Despite the fact that hospitals exert
obvious and substantial control over the process, the weight of prec-
edent protects hospitals from informed consent duties.159
CONCLUSION
I echo other scholars when I insist that in childbirth there is
more than one “right” or “reasonable” way.160 Thus, any advocacy for
childbirth via relevant law should be directed at expanding the field
to account for different cultures and ideas about what is reasonable
or unreasonable. Tort liability provides opportunities and challenges
for this proposal. The challenges include the history of hospital im-
munity, the limits of corporate liability theory, the informed consent
doctrine, and the fact that hospitals typically bring more resources to
litigation than plaintiffs can afford.161 Opportunities include making
151. Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
158. See Ketler, supra note 114, at 1052–56.
159. This is one reason why scholars who advocate strongly for doctor-patient informed
consent might want to expand their analysis. See, e.g., Ketler, supra note 114, at 1036–37.
160. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 549 (1993–
1994); see also Law, supra note 51, at 349–52.
161. See Fraser, supra note 33, at 255–58, 276–77.
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inroads where medical malpractice is rooted, expanding the defini-
tions of reasonableness, and calling into question the institutional
reasons for VBAC bans.162
Establishing hospital liability for VBAC bans would require the
right set of facts in the right jurisdiction—facts I would not wish on
anyone—such as a plaintiff who was severely injured by a forced
cesarean or whose baby was injured as well. Such facts could tip the
scales in favor of novel legal arguments or new ways of applying
established doctrine.
Physicians and nurse midwives may be better situated than
their patients to challenge such policies as they have the proven
ability to organize and leverage their power toward their profes-
sional interests.163 VBAC ban policies put providers in a very precar-
ious position, compromise their ethical duties, and open them up to
increased liability; lobbying against these policies could also serve
their own bottom line.164 The fact that they could also challenge
these policies as violations of the informed consent standard of care
and of the medical standard of care adds strength to their argument.165
Certified Nurse Midwives and family physicians, like Dr. Gayatri,
may even be entitled to an antitrust claim, since requiring VBAC
also gives obstetricians a monopoly over all patients with a previous
cesarean.166 In general, when hospital care providers are educated
about the law and develop an analysis about how it operates to con-
strain and protect them, they are better positioned to become advo-
cates not only in the area of VBAC bans, but also with other policies
that limit the field in pregnancy and birth.167
Administrative law relating to hospital regulations is another
area that warrants further exploration. The requirements for partici-
pation set forth by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
include informed consent provisions and this creates the possibility
of challenging VBAC bans through administrative channels.168 Since
many hospitals rely on federal funds they must be responsive to
Medicaid regulations thus opening up the possibility of a petition for
162. See Law, supra note 51, at 362–71.
163. See Daniel W. Srsic, Collective Bargaining by Physicians in the United States and
Canada, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 89 (1993); Elizabeth Thompson Beckley, Strength in Numbers:
Employed Physicians Enlist Unions for Bargaining Clout, MODERN PHYSICIAN (Feb. 26,
2001), http://www.modernphysician.com/article/20010226/modernphysician/102260353
/&template=printpicart_mp.
164. See Law, supra note 51, at 369, 371, 377–79.
165. Id. at 369–70.
166. See Havighurst, supra note 60, at 1149–50.
167. Law, supra note 51, at 371 (suggesting such a challenge to the use of electronic
fetal monitors).
168. 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(c)(2)(v) (2012).
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a rule-making that requires right of refusal provisions in all facili-
ties that receive Medicaid funds, or even more explicitly, one that
requires VBAC be available in all such facilities.169 Alternately, one
could petition for an interpretive rule determining whether the in-
formed consent and right of refusal provisions create a hospital duty
of informed consent.
An immediate strategy available to maternity care consumers
to challenge VBAC bans is to give birth at home or in birth centers;
vaginal birth is within the expertise and accessibility of most preg-
nant women.170 At the same time, I recognize that for many this
course of action is not an option for a variety of reasons: the respon-
sibility of giving birth outside the hospital is significant, many places
do not have birth centers, many home birth midwives may not legally
attend VBACs—or in places, any births—at home, many insurance
companies resist reimbursing families for home birth and birth cen-
ter services, and finally, such a commitment requires a fundamental
challenge that many are not prepared to face.171
Beyond the act of giving birth, other social and legal action can
work to make sure that birth centers and home births are viable
options. Ultimately, it will take effort on all these fronts using mul-
tiple strategies to change not only VBAC bans, but the underlying
structures that make such bans possible.
169. See Eleanor A. Kinney, Rule and Policy making for the Medicaid Program: A
Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 860, 869–72 (1990); Elizabeth Kukura,
Choice in Birth: Preserving Access to VBAC, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 955, 977–78 (2010).
170. See Kukura, supra note 169, at 984; Paul C. E. Torio, Nature Versus Suture: Why
VBAC Should Still Be in Vogue, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 487, 512 (2010).
171. Baker, supra note 65, at 583, 587.
